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Abstract 
This paper challenges the view that foreign investors lead firms to adopt a short-term 
orientation and forgo long-term investment. Using a comprehensive sample of publicly 
listed firms in 30 countries over the period 2001–2010, we find instead that greater 
foreign institutional ownership fosters long-term investment in tangible, intangible, and 
human capital. Foreign institutional ownership also leads to significant increases in 
innovation output. We identify these effects by exploiting the exogenous variation in 
foreign institutional ownership that follows the addition of a stock to the MSCI indexes. 
Our results suggest that foreign institutions exert a disciplinary role on entrenched 
corporate insiders worldwide.  
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“We support those companies, who act in interest of their future and in interest of their 
employees against irresponsible locust swarms, who measure success in quarterly intervals, 
suck off substance and let companies die once they have eaten them away.”  
– Franz Müntefering, German Social Democratic Party chairman, 2005 
“The effects of the short-termist phenomenon are troubling... In the face of these pressures, 
more and more corporate leaders have responded with actions that can deliver immediate 
returns to shareholders, such as buybacks or dividend increases, while underinvesting in 
innovation, skilled workforces or essential CAPEX necessary to sustain long-term growth.” 
– Laurence Fink, CEO, BlackRock, 2015 
1. Introduction 
How does financial globalization affect long-term corporate investment and productivity? In 
recent decades, companies have trended away from the stakeholder capitalism model of 
concentrated ownership historically predominant in continental Europe and Japan, in which long-
term relationships with labor, creditors, and other stakeholders are promoted (Tirole, 2001; 
Carlin and Mayer, 2003; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2015). Instead, many companies are 
moving toward the Anglo-Saxon shareholder capitalism model, with its dispersed and globalized 
shareholder structure. Foreign institutional investors are agents in this change, playing an 
increasingly prominent monitoring role as shareholders worldwide (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and 
Matos, 2011).  
In this paper, we examine two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the presence of foreign 
institutional investors as shareholders can lead managers to cut long-term investment by reducing 
capital expenditures, research and development (R&D) expenditures, and employment. This 
view posits that foreign portfolio flows represent “hot money” in search of short-term profits, 
with little concern for long-term firm prospects.1 Regulators and policy makers have expressed 
concerns that the rising importance of activist investors is leading firms toward short-termist 
strategies, delivering immediate returns to shareholders at the expense of long-term investment 
                                                 
1 Brennan and Cao (1997) argue that foreign investors, less informed about the prospects of local stocks, may 
rebalance portfolios disproportionally and amplify the stock reaction to negative public news. Borensztein and Gelos 
(2003) suggest that international capital flows are more “panic-prone” in emerging markets.  
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(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2015). In one high-profile case, 
Franz Müntefering, German Social Democratic Party chairman, compared foreign private equity 
and activist hedge fund investors targeting German companies to an invasion of “locusts” 
stripping companies bare.2 The “locust” label has since been used to refer to foreign investors 
more broadly (Benoit, 2007; The Economist, 2007). Locust foreign capital, it is proposed, could 
lead companies to strip assets for short-term profits, delocalize production, and adopt unfriendly 
labor policies, including layoffs. This attitude is part of a more general phenomenon of 
protectionist sentiment with regard to foreign capital flows.3  
Foreign institutional investors may create market pressure inducing short-termism if they 
prompt managers to prioritize short-term earnings over long-term growth. Ferreira, Manso, and 
Silva (2014) argue that the stock market pressures managers to select projects that they can 
easily communicate to investors; managers forgo innovation in favor of ready-made 
technologies, which are more transparent to investors. Foreign institutions, moreover, may be 
less tolerant of failure, which can place executives at greater risk for career concerns, including 
termination. These factors may steer risk-averse managers away from pursuing opportunities for 
innovative growth. 
The second hypothesis is that foreign institutional investor monitoring promotes long-term 
investment in fixed capital, innovation, and human capital. This positive impact derives from the 
disciplinary effect of the presence of institutions on corporate insiders. Institutional investors 
may persuade managers, who tend to prefer a quiet life (Hart, 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003), to innovate via diplomacy, actively voting their shares, or even confrontational proxy 
fights. In an international context, other corporate insiders, such as blockholders, may extract 
                                                 
2 A prominent example is the bathroom hardware maker Grohe, which the U.S. private equity group TPG Capital 
took over in 2004. TPG Capital’s original plans called for job cuts. However, Grohe subsequently invested in R&D, 
improved profitability, and reduced its labor force less than expected (Milne, 2008). Another case is Children’s 
Investment Fund, a UK hedge fund, which helped block Deutsche Börse’s attempt to buy the London Stock 
Exchange, arguing that buying back shares would be a better use of its cash (The Economist, 2005). 
3 Dinc and Erel (2013) find evidence of economic nationalism in mergers and acquisitions in Europe, in that 
governments prefer to see target companies remaining in domestic hands. 
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private benefits through control and may not be diversified, making them averse to risk.4 
Foreign institutions may be in a better position than domestic institutional investors to 
monitor corporate insiders and influence strategic decision making. Domestic institutions, 
because they are more likely to have business ties with local companies, may have a closer 
relation with the firms they invest in. They may thus be more accommodating to corporate 
insiders and less effective as external monitors (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008).5 In contrast, because they are less encumbered by ties with corporate insiders, foreign 
institutions can reduce managerial entrenchment and promote investment in riskier opportunities 
for growth. Foreign institutions may also be better able to tolerate the high-risk/high-return trade-
off associated with long-term investment because they can better diversify risks through their 
international portfolios.6 
To test our hypotheses, we use a comprehensive data set of portfolio equity holdings by 
institutional investors covering more than 30,000 publicly listed firms in 30 countries over the 
period 2001–2010. We find that higher ownership by foreign institutions leads to an increase in 
long-term investment (proxied by capital and R&D expenditures) and innovation output (proxied 
by patent counts). We also find that these increases in investment in tangible and intangible 
capital do not induce unfriendly labor policies. On the contrary, we find that higher foreign 
institutional ownership leads to increases in employment and measures of human and 
organization capital.  
The endogeneity of foreign institutional ownership makes it difficult to establish a causal 
effect. In fact, foreign institutions may choose to invest in firms with better long-term growth 
prospects or in firms for which they anticipate a surge in innovation. We address the omitted 
                                                 
4 In an alternative to the voice channel, institutional investors can threaten to exit (e.g., selling and depressing 
stock prices). Our identification strategy using stock additions to the MSCI All Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) 
emphasizes the voice channel. 
5 Domestic institutional investors are often affiliated with banks that act as creditors, underwriters, advisors or 
hold seats on boards (Ferreira and Matos, 2012; Ferreira, Matos, and Pires, 2016). 
6 There are some markets that have witnessed the development of independent domestic institutions. For example, 
Giannetti and Laeven (2009) show that the reform of the pension system in Sweden increased investor monitoring, 
but only by independent private pension funds.  
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variables concern using firm fixed effects that control for time-invariant unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Further, we address reverse causality (and omitted variables) concerns using 
instrumental variables methods that isolate a plausibly exogenous variation in foreign 
institutional ownership. We exploit the fact that foreign institutions are more likely to invest in 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indexes’ stocks, because international portfolios 
are typically benchmarked against these indexes (Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks, 2016). 
Our instrument for foreign institutional ownership is the stock additions (and deletions) to the 
MSCI All Country World Index (MSCI ACWI). 
The first-stage results indicate that foreign institutions increase their holdings by nearly 3% 
of market capitalization when a firm’s stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. Importantly, we find 
that domestic institutional ownership does not increase significantly when a firm’s stock is added 
to the MSCI ACWI. This result suggests that stock additions do not affect our outcomes of 
interest through channels other than foreign institutional ownership (e.g., new information about 
firms’ future prospects, investor recognition or attention, and changes in capital supply), and thus 
supports the validity of the exclusion restriction. 
The second-stage results indicate that a 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads 
to a 0.3% increase in long-term investment (as a fraction of assets), a 12% increase in 
employment, and an 11% increase in innovation output. We obtain similar results when we 
restrict our sample to firms in the 10% bandwidth of the number of stocks around the cutoff that 
determines the inclusion in the MSCI ACWI.7 Results are also consistent when we employ a 
difference-in-differences estimation around the stock addition events. We conclude that foreign 
institutional ownership has a positive effect on long-term investment, employment, and 
innovation, which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. 
We also examine the impact of stock additions on firms’ financial policies. Using difference-
in-differences estimation, we find that the increase in financing needs due to the increase in long-
                                                 
7 The MSCI ACWI contains the largest firms and covers about 85% of the free float-adjusted market 
capitalization in each country.  
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term investment following stock additions to the MSCI ACWI is covered by a decrease in cash 
holdings and an increase in new debt issuance. Importantly, our results show that firms issue less 
equity, use less external financing, and use more internal financing after the inclusion of their 
shares in the MSCI ACWI, which is consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure. 
These results mitigate the concern that the increase in long-term investment following the 
addition of a stock to the index is driven by an increase in the supply of capital, which may 
enable a firm to raise more external capital at a lower cost. 
The evidence from stock additions suggests that indexed money managers play an active 
governance role and influence corporate policies. Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) and Crane, 
Michenaud, and Weston (2016) use stock additions into the Russell indexes as an identification 
strategy and find that passive investors (in a portfolio management sense) act as active investors 
(in a corporate governance sense) in the United States. In fact, Larry Fink, chairman of 
BlackRock, the world’s largest (and mostly indexed) asset manager, sent a high-profile letter to 
chief executives asking them to “understand that corporate leaders’ duty of care and loyalty is 
not to every investor or trader who owns their companies’ shares at any moment in time, but to 
the company and its long-term owners.”  
We conduct several tests to examine whether foreign institutions increase long-term 
investment, employment, and innovation output through the monitoring channel. Using 
investors’ portfolio turnover as a measure of investment horizon (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 
2005; Harford, Kecskes, and Mansi, 2015), we find that long-term foreign institutional 
ownership has a stronger positive relation with the outcome variables than short-term foreign 
institutional ownership. To the extent that long-term investors have a greater incentive to 
monitor, this evidence supports the monitoring hypothesis. We also examine whether the country 
of origin of foreign institutional investors matters. We find a positive and statistically significant 
relation between the outcome variables and common law-based foreign institutional ownership. 
This result is consistent with foreign institutions from common law countries “exporting” good 
governance practices, providing further support for the monitoring hypothesis. 
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Next, we find a positive effect of foreign institutional ownership when firms have weaker 
corporate governance and when country-level investor protection is weaker. Further, we find a 
positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and innovation output when 
competition in product markets is less intense (i.e., when managers are more entrenched). If 
corporate governance standards are weak or there is little competition, managers are not 
disciplined by such mechanisms as boards and the threat of takeover or bankruptcy, and there is 
more need for monitoring by foreign institutions. These results again support the monitoring 
channel. Overall, our findings suggest that foreign institutions act as effective monitors and 
persuade corporate insiders to pursue long-term projects instead of enjoying a quiet life.8 
Last, we examine whether the presence of foreign institutions enhances firm value. Indeed, 
increases in long-term investment and innovation output could be symptoms of overinvestment 
or “empire building” (Jensen, 1986). To this end, we conduct additional tests using several 
measures of firm performance. We find that foreign institutional ownership is positively 
associated with total factor productivity, foreign sales, and shareholder value, suggesting that 
foreign ownership does not lead to overinvestment.  
There is mixed evidence on the impact of institutional investors on long-term U.S. 
investment. Bushee (1998) finds that firms with larger institutional ownership are less likely to 
cut R&D expenditures to reverse a decline in earnings. Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 
(2013) find that institutional ownership has a positive effect on innovation by mitigating 
managers’ career concerns. Harford, Kecskes, and Mansi (2015) show that long-term 
institutional investors monitor managers and encourage firm policies that increase shareholder 
value and discourage overinvestment. 
Previous research has also examined the effect of private equity and activist hedge funds on 
firm policies and performance. In a cross-country study, Bernstein, Lerner, Sørensen, and 
                                                 
8 The evidence differs from the career concern hypothesis that explains the role of domestic institutions in 
corporate innovation in the United States (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). This may be due to the fact 
that other corporate insiders matter more in an international context, while domestic institutions represent the 
majority of institutional ownership in U.S. firms. 
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Strömberg (2017) show that industries that receive private equity investments grow faster in 
terms of output and employment.9 The evidence is mixed with respect to activist hedge funds. 
Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2017) show that firms targeted by activists reduce R&D expenditures 
but increase innovation output, while Cremers, Giambona, Sepe, and Wang (2015) find that 
activism decreases long-term firm value, especially among more innovative firms. Using a cross-
country sample, Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2017) find that the returns to hedge fund 
activism are economically important and that activists are more likely to engage targets with high 
foreign institutional ownership. We contribute to this literature by showing that foreign portfolio 
investors who hold minority stakes play an important role in monitoring firms worldwide. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that there is large heterogeneity in the effect of foreign owners on 
firm policies and performance.  
Our paper is related to the literature on the role of stock markets in promoting or distorting 
manager incentives to pursue short-term performance at the expense of long-term performance. 
Stein (1988, 1989) discusses investor myopia and optimal managerial decision-making in 
irrational stock markets. Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) show that short-termism 
distorts investment and innovation decisions in U.S. public firms. However, Acharya and Xu 
(2017) find that public listing is beneficial to the innovation of firms in industries that are more 
dependent on external finance. Kaplan (2015) names the Internet, the fracking revolution, and 
the biotech booms of recent decades as evidence against the short-termist view of U.S. 
corporations that were part of a “failing capital investment system” (Porter, 1992). We contribute 
to this literature by studying the role of cross-border portfolio flows for long-term investment 
and innovation output. 
Our paper also adds to recent international studies on innovation. Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and 
Thomas (2012) show that foreign direct investment has a positive impact on innovation in local 
                                                 
9 In terms of U.S. private equity investors, Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014) 
show that leveraged buyouts bring modest net job losses and gains in productivity, while Lerner, Sørensen, and 
Strömberg (2011) show that buyout targets do not cut innovation activities. 
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firms through technology and know-how transfers. Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014) find that equity 
market development positively affects innovation. In contemporaneous work, Luong, Moshirian, 
Nguyen, Tian, and Zhang (2017) find that foreign institutional investors enhance innovation but 
do not explore the implications for long-term investment and employment. Others examine the 
role of different stakeholders in the innovation process, such as blockholders, creditors, and 
workers. Hsu, Huang, Massa, and Zhang (2015) show that family ownership promotes 
innovation. Using country-level data, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2013) show that 
employee-friendly laws promote innovation, while Acharya and Subramanian (2009) show that 
creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes hinder innovation.  
2. Data and variables 
Our initial sample consists of a panel of publicly listed firms in the period 2001–2010 drawn 
from the Worldscope database. We exclude utilities (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes 4900–4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) because these industries tend to be 
regulated. We further restrict the sample to firms based in the 30 countries in which publicly 
listed firms have, in total, at least ten patents over the sample period and $10 billion of stock 
market capitalization. The final sample consists of 30,952 unique firms for a total of 181,173 
firm-year observations.  
2.1. Long-term investment 
In our main tests, we focus on the long-term investment in both tangible and intangible 
capital, which we proxy for by the sum of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D expenditures. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that our sample firms invested almost $16.3 trillion in fixed capital in 
2001–2010. U.S. and non-U.S. firms have a similar average CAPEX-to-assets ratio at 5%. Panel 
B of Table 1 shows that the industries (using the Fama-French 12-industry classification) with 
the highest capital intensity are energy and telecoms.  
Our data show that R&D expenditures are well distributed across regions in the world in our 
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sample period. Panel A of Table 1 shows that our sample firms invested almost $4.7 trillion in 
R&D in 2001–2010. U.S. firms have the highest average R&D-to-assets ratio at 5.1%, far 
exceeding the average of 1.5% for non-U.S. firms (we set R&D expenditures to zero for firms 
that do not report R&D).10 Although U.S. firms lead in terms of R&D intensity, the combined 
R&D spending of non-U.S. firms exceeded that of U.S. firms over the sample period. This 
suggests an increased globalization of innovation activities. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the 
industries with the highest R&D intensity are healthcare, business equipment, and consumer 
durables.11  
2.2. Human and organization capital 
Along with investment in tangible and intangible capital, firms need to make long-term 
investments in human and organization capital. In this regard, the notion that foreign investors 
act as “locusts” is that they may push for strategies that are adverse to labor, such as 
delocalization of production or employee layoffs, as a way to boost short-term performance. To 
proxy for investment in human capital, we use the logarithm of the number of employees 
(LABOR), which has a wide coverage in Worldscope. For non-U.S. firms, we also use wage-
based proxies: staff costs-to-sales ratio (STAFF_COST) and average staff costs per employee 
(AV_STAFF_COST). While LABOR and STAFF_COST measure the level of employment and 
labor costs, AV_STAFF_COST measures the relative importance of high- versus low-skill jobs. 
To proxy for investment in organization capital (Eisfeldt and Papanikolau, 2013), we use the 
ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to sales (SG&A). 
                                                 
10 International Accounting Standard “IAS 38 Intangible Assets” defines the accounting requirements for 
investments in creating intangible assets such as R&D. Historically, there have been potential sample selection 
issues due to the voluntary nature of R&D disclosure and differences in national accounting standards. Hall and 
Oriani (2006) conclude that even though reporting R&D was not required in some countries in continental Europe, 
in fact, a fairly large share of major companies reported it. Additionally, in the second half of the 2000s, the 
transition by many firms to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has considerably improved R&D 
reporting practices. In the robustness section, we run our tests for the 2005–2010 post-IFRS adoption period. 
11 We provide more detailed statistics in the Internet Appendix. Panel A of Fig. IA.1 shows that CAPEX is well 
distributed worldwide, and Panel A of Fig. IA.2 shows a rise in the share of CAPEX of firms located in the Asia 
Pacific region during the 2000s. Panels B and C show similar patterns for R&D expenditures and patent counts. 
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2.3. Innovation output 
We measure the output of firms’ R&D activity by the number of patents, the exclusive rights 
over the invention of a product or a process. Researchers have argued that patent counts are the 
most important measure of firms’ innovation output (Griliches, 1990). While patent counts per se 
do not necessarily convey the economic value of underlying inventions, there is ample evidence 
of a positive relation between patents and firm value both in the United States (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2005) and in Europe (Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi, 2007).  
We collect information from the complete set of patent grant publications issued weekly by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). In this way, we obtain the universe of utility 
patents awarded by the USPTO to both U.S. and non-U.S. firms.12 For each patent, we identify 
patent assignees listed in the patent grant document, countries of these assignees, and whether 
each assignee is a firm, an individual, or a government entity. Using this information, we match 
patents to the publicly listed firms in Worldscope. The matching algorithm involves two main 
steps. First, we standardize patent assignee and firm names, focusing on unifying suffixes and 
removing the non-informative parts of patent assignee and firm names. Second, we apply 
multiple fuzzy-string matching techniques to identify the firm, if any, to which each patent 
belongs. Using this procedure, we match 1,411,376 patents to 13,045 unique firms for patent 
applications from 1990 to 2010.13  
We focus on USPTO patents to measure innovation output in the international setting for 
several reasons. First, we follow the commonly used approach to calculate patent indicators 
based on information from the most important patent office (the USPTO). We choose this 
approach because patent regulations (with regard to the scope of patent protection) and patent 
office practices (governing the processing and publishing of patent applications) across different 
                                                 
12 The USPTO publications are also the source for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent 
database developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2002), which is commonly used by researchers. 
13 The Internet Appendix provides a detailed description of the matching procedure and a comparison to the 




countries may not be comparable. This makes the aggregation of patent statistics difficult across 
different patent offices and over time.  
Second, for non-U.S. firms, the patents in the sample arguably reflect more important 
innovations to make these firms willing to accept the costs of securing a patent in the United 
States. In this way, we address the criticism that there is excessive heterogeneity in the quality of 
patents. In our regressions, we include country fixed effects that remove a possible home 
advantage bias by U.S. firms, as well as any foreign country-level bias caused by applying for 
U.S. patents.  
Last, our sample contains predominantly large firms that commonly protect their innovations 
by applying for patents simultaneously at the USPTO, European Patent Office (EPO), and 
Japanese Patent Office (JPO), irrespective of domicile. The use of USPTO patents therefore does 
not necessarily underestimate innovation output. In robustness checks, we also examine “triadic” 
patents (i.e., patents applied for simultaneously at all three major patent officesUSPTO, EPO, 
and JPO). This alternative definition of patent counts alleviates concerns from relying on the 
USPTO data, and it addresses the concern that USPTO-filed patents may be especially visible or 
attractive to U.S.-based institutional investors and may thus drive our results on innovation 
output. 
We count patents as of the filing date, which is the time that is closest to when the innovation 
was created. In the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression tests, we use the logarithm of one 
plus the number of patents applied for by a firm in a given year (PATENTS). We assume that the 
patent count is zero for firm-years with missing USPTO information. In robustness checks, we 
use count-data models and patent counts weighted by the number of citations (CITATIONS). 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that our sample firms were granted a total of 686,541 patents over 
2001–2010. The distribution of patents across countries illustrates the global nature of 
innovation. More than half of the USPTO patents are granted to non-U.S. firms. Japanese firms 
have the highest average patent count per year, followed by the United States. The United States 
has the highest number of firms reporting patents, followed by Japan and South Korea. Although 
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German firms are also highly active in innovation, European firms overall filed fewer USPTO 
patents as a region than Asian or North American firms. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the 
business equipment sector accounts for more than half of all patents.14  
2.4. Institutional ownership  
We collect institutional holdings data from the FactSet/LionShares database for the period 
2000–2009.15 The institutions in the database are professional money managers such as mutual 
funds, pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance companies. See Ferreira and Matos (2008) for 
more details on these data.  
We define total institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL) as the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions in a firm’s stock divided by its total market capitalization at the end of each calendar 
year.16 Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), we set 
institutional ownership variables to zero if a stock is not held by any institution in 
FactSet/LionShares.17 Next, we separate total institutional ownership by the nationality of the 
institution. Domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM) is the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions domiciled in the same country in which the stock is listed divided by the firm’s 
market capitalization, while foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) is the sum of the holdings 
of all institutions domiciled in a country different from the one in which the stock is listed 
divided by the firm’s market capitalization.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the countries with the highest average total institutional 
ownership as of 2009 are the United States (75%), Canada (53%), Israel (48%), and Sweden 
                                                 
14 Some authors argue that computer, electronics, and software patents may be applied for merely to build patent 
portfolios for strategic reasons rather than to protect real inventions. In robustness tests, we address this concern by 
using patent counts adjusted by the average number of patents in each technological class and time period (Bena and 
Li, 2014). 
15 Since we lag the explanatory variables by one year, our institutional ownership data span the period 2000–2009. 
The FactSet/LionShares institutional ownership data are available at the Wharton Research Data Services website: 
https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/factset/holdingsbyfirmmsci/index.cfm?navId=195. 
16 In calculating institutional ownership, we include ordinary shares, preferred shares, American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs), Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), and dual listings. 
17 When we repeat the analysis using only firms with positive holdings, our main results are not affected. 
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(40%). The average institutional ownership is 43% worldwide and 23% for non-U.S. firms in our 
sample in 2009. Even though they are, on average, minority shareholders, institutions tend to be 
the most influential group in terms of their share of trading (effectively being the marginal 
investors) and in terms of shareholder activism. In most countries, the holdings of foreign 
institutions exceed those of domestic institutions; the exceptions are Canada, Sweden, and the 
United States. 
2.5. Financing  
We obtain data on firms’ financial policies from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
New Issues and Worldscope databases. To measure changes in firms’ use of external finance, we 
obtain the proceeds of new equity issues (EQ_ISSUES) and new debt issues (DEBT_ISSUES) 
from SDC. As an alternative, we use net equity issuance (NET_EQ_ISSUES) and net debt 
issuance (NET_DEBT_ISSUES) from the cash flow statements in Worldscope. We also calculate 
measures of a firm’s total external financing by adding up new equity and debt issuance 
(EXT_FIN) and net equity and debt issuance (NET_EXT_FIN). We use the change in cash 
holdings (CASH) as a measure of firms’ internal financing. All these variables are scaled by 
assets and set to zero for firm-years with missing information. 
2.6. Firm characteristics 
We obtain several firm-level control variables from the Worldscope database. In the 
regressions, we control for insider ownership, which we measure by the fraction of closely held 
shares (CLOSE) of both (domestic and foreign) blockholders. The objectives and risk-taking 
incentives of blockholders are likely to differ from those of institutional investors. Because 
exporting firms may be more likely to innovate, we also control for the foreign-to-total sales 
ratio (FXSALES). In the innovation output regressions, we use the same control variables as 
Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), namely, the logarithm of sales (SALES), the 
logarithm of capital-to-labor ratio (CAPITAL/LABOR), and cumulative R&D expenditures 
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(R&D_STOCK). In the long-term investment regressions, we also include Tobin’s Q 
(TOBIN_Q), free cash-flow-to-assets ratio (FCF), debt-to-assets ratio (LEVERAGE), cash 
holdings-to-assets ratio (CASH), and net property, plant, and equipment-to-assets ratio 
(TANGIBILITY). Table 2 shows summary statistics for each variable, and Table A.1 in the 
Appendix provides variable definitions. 
3. Results 
3.1. Identification strategy 
There is a plausible concern that OLS regressions may suffer from endogenous selection 
bias. Skilled foreign institutional investors may invest in firms (on the basis of characteristics 
that are unobservable to us) with better growth prospects or anticipate a surge in innovation, 
which could explain the positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and long-term 
investment, employment, or innovation output. To address this concern, we use regressions with 
firm fixed effects that account for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity.  
Further, we implement an instrumental variables (IV) approach using two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regressions. Following Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011), we use the inclusion 
of a firm’s stock in the MSCI All Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) as an instrument for 
foreign institutional ownership, which addresses reverse causality and measurement error 
concerns, in addition to a possible bias due to time-varying omitted variables. The MSCI ACWI 
includes large and mid-cap equities across 23 developed markets and 23 emerging markets, so it 
encompasses all of the MSCI indexes that are the most commonly used benchmarks by foreign 
portfolio investors (e.g., MSCI World, MSCI EAFE, and MSCI Emerging Markets).18 We 
                                                 
18 As of 2015, the MSCI ACWI had 2,480 constituents and the index covered approximately 85% of the global 
investable equity opportunity set. Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2016) show that the MSCI indexes are the 
most followed by mutual funds around the world. For example, the Financial Times (Noble and Bullock, 2015) 
reports that these benchmarks are currently tracked by funds worth $1.7 trillion and that the potential addition of 
China A-shares to the MSCI indexes might cause significant rebalancing of institutional investors’ portfolios. In the 




exploit the exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership around the threshold that 
determines additions of stocks to the index. Stocks are included in the index such that it covers 
about 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each country (Morgan Stanley 
Capital International, 2015).  Specifically, the rule is that stocks are included in the index in 
descending order of their free float-adjusted market capitalization until the cumulative share of 
firms included in the index reaches 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each 
country. Because index membership is determined by the mechanical rule that firms are included 
depending on their market capitalization ranking, the variation in foreign institutional ownership 
induced by this rule is plausibly exogenous (at least within a bandwidth).  
The importance of index membership for foreign institutional ownership is illustrated in Fig. 
1 as of 2009 (the final year of our sample period). We sort stocks using their end-of-year free 
float-adjusted market capitalization in each country and plot the foreign institutional ownership 
(IO_FOR) against the cumulative share of firms. Fig. 1 shows a discontinuity in IO_FOR around 
the 85% threshold of the cumulative share of firms. 
Our IV estimation relies on the assumption that the stock addition to the MSCI ACWI is 
associated with an increase in IO_FOR (relevance condition) but does not directly affect our 
outcome variables except through its impact on ownership by foreign institutions (exclusion 
restriction). We verify the relevance condition in the first-stage estimation, and the exclusion 
restriction seems reasonable as it is unclear why the stock addition to the index would be directly 
related to our outcome variables after controlling for the factors that determine index 
membership. In fact, the exclusion restriction assumption is likely to be satisfied as stocks are 
added to the MSCI ACWI because they represent a country’s investable equities, not because of 
the firms’ expected performance or policies.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Reenen, and Zingales, 2013) or the discontinuity in the Russell 1,000/2,000 indexes (e.g., Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim, 2016) as an exogenous shock to institutional ownership. 
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3.2. Baseline results 
Tables 3–5 present the baseline results of the long-term effects of foreign institutional 
ownership (IO_FOR) obtained using both OLS and IV regressions. Our main outcome variables 
are: (1) long-term investment (proxied by the ratio of CAPEX plus R&D expenditure-to-assets); 
(2) human capital (proxied by employment); and (3) innovation output (proxied by patent 
counts). The regressions include firm and year fixed effects and control for domestic institutional 
ownership (IO_DOM), as well as other firm characteristics that may also affect the outcome 
variables. In the IV regressions, the instrument is a dummy variable (MSCI) that equals one if a 
firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI in a given year, and zero otherwise.19 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of the effect of foreign institutional ownership on 
long-term investment (CAPEX+R&D). Column 1 presents the results of the first-stage regression 
of the IV estimator in which the coefficient on MSCI tests whether the instrument is correlated 
with foreign institutional ownership. In our specification with firm and year fixed effects, the 
result is driven by within-firm changes in the MSCI variable, that is, by stock additions to or 
deletions from the MSCI ACWI. The coefficient on MSCI is positive and statistically significant 
with a partial F-statistic well above the conventional threshold of 10 for weak instruments. 
Foreign institutions hold about 3% more of stock market capitalization in firms that are included 
in the MSCI ACWI.20 
Column 2 presents the OLS second-stage regression results. The coefficient on foreign 
institutional ownership (IO_FOR) is positive and statistically significant, which means that there 
                                                 
19 To check the validity of our identification strategy, we also estimate reduced-form regressions using the 
instrumental variable (MSCI) as the explanatory variable. Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix reports the results for 
long-term investment, employment, and innovation output. The coefficients on MSCI are positive and statistically 
significant in all specifications, which indicates that the data support our identification strategy. 
20 As a placebo test, we also estimate the first-stage regression of domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM) on 
the MSCI instrument. Table IA.3 in the Internet Appendix shows the results. The coefficient on MSCI is statistically 
insignificant. Since domestic institutions do not increase (decrease) their holdings following stock additions to 
(deletions from) the MSCI ACWI, this result suggests that the index recomposition events do not reveal new 
information to institutional investors about the firms’ future growth prospects (Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov, 
and Yu, 2003). This result also does not support other channels that could explain our findings, such as investor 




is a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and long-term investment. Column 
3 presents IV estimates using MSCI as an instrument for foreign institutional ownership. The IV 
coefficient on foreign institutional ownership is positive and statistically significant. A 3% 
increase in foreign institutional ownership leads to an increase of about 0.3% in long-term 
investment. The coefficient on foreign institutional ownership from the IV regression is larger 
than that reported in Column 2 from the OLS regression. The OLS bias toward zero could be 
caused by either foreign institutions selecting firms that are currently underinvesting (but may 
increase investment in the future) or the attenuation bias stemming from measurement error in 
foreign institutional ownership.21  
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of the effect of foreign institutional ownership 
separately for the individual components of long-term investment: CAPEX and R&D. The OLS 
coefficient estimates on IO_FOR in Columns 1 and 3 are positive and statistically significant, 
indicating a positive association between foreign institutional ownership and both components of 
long-term investment. The IV coefficient estimates on IO_FOR in Columns 2 and 4 are also 
positive and statistically significant. A 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads to an 
increase of about 0.2% in CAPEX and to an increase of about 0.1% in R&D, which represents 
about 5% of the mean in both cases.22 
Table 4 reports the results for human capital as proxied by the logarithm of the number of 
employees (LABOR). In Column 1, we re-estimate the first-stage regression using the sample for 
which LABOR is available. The coefficient of 0.028 on MSCI is almost unchanged compared to 
that reported in Column 1 of Table 3. The OLS coefficient estimate on IO_FOR in Column 2 is 
positive and statistically significant, indicating a positive association between foreign 
institutional ownership and employment. The IV coefficient on foreign institutional ownership is 
                                                 
21 In fact, foreign institutional ownership might be noisy owing to differences in mandatory portfolio holdings 
disclosure rules across countries, as well as recording and classification mistakes. 
22 Alternatively, we can gauge the economic significance by estimating the impact of a one standard deviation 
increase in foreign institutional ownership (0.07) on long-term investment: an increase of 0.7% in CAPEX+R&D 
(corresponds to 10% of the mean), an increase of 0.5% in CAPEX (corresponds to 11% of the mean), and an 
increase of 0.2% in R&D (corresponds to 9% of the mean). 
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also positive and statistically significant. A 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads 
to an increase of about 12% in the number of employees.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the effect of foreign institutional ownership on 
innovation output as proxied by the logarithm of one plus the number of patents (PATENTS). In 
Column 1, we re-estimate the first-stage regression using the sample for which PATENTS is 
available. The coefficient of 0.027 on MSCI is almost unchanged compared to that reported in 
Column 1 of Table 3. The OLS coefficient estimate on IO_FOR in Column 2 is positive and 
statistically significant. There is a positive association between foreign institutional ownership 
and innovation output. The IV coefficient estimate on foreign institutional ownership is also 
positive and statistically significant. A 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads to an 
increase of about 11% in patent counts.  Similar to Tables 3 and 4 on long-term investment and 
employment, the estimates of the effect of foreign institutional ownership are larger in the IV 
regression compared to the OLS regression. This result suggests that the OLS regression 
underestimates the positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on innovation output by 
treating institutional ownership as exogenous. Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) also 
find a negative selection bias indicating that OLS regressions underestimate the positive effect of 
institutional ownership on innovation for U.S. firms.23 
We also examine the effect of foreign institutional ownership on innovation output using a 
Poisson regressiona nonlinear count-data model (which has a mass point at zero).24 The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Because the firms without innovation output (zero patents) 
can now be included, we are able to use the full sample of firms. We include firm fixed effects 
using the pre-sample mean scaling method introduced by Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen 
                                                 
23 We repeat our analysis excluding firm-years with zero patents by estimating regressions using the logarithm of 
the number of patents as the dependent variable. The results reported in Table IA.4 in the Internet Appendix show 
that the positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and patents is robust when we use this alternative 
specification. 
24 Alternatively, we estimate negative binomial regressions. The results reported in Table IA.5 in the Internet 
Appendix show that the positive relation between foreign institutional ownership and patents is robust when we use 
this alternative count-data model. 
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(1999).25 In addition, we account for the endogeneity of foreign institutional ownership by using 
the control function approach (Blundell and Powell, 2004). The coefficients on foreign 
institutional ownership are positive and statistically significant. Using the IV estimate in 
Column 3, a 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership is associated with about an 18% 
increase in the probability of obtaining an additional patent per year.26 
The IV results suggest that (foreign) indexed money managers influence corporate policies. 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) also suggest that quasi-indexed investors increasingly play an 
active role in corporate governance in the United States. Following Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim (2016), we repeat the IV estimation using a sample restricted to firms in the 10% 
bandwidth of the number of stocks around the MSCI ACWI cutoff that determines inclusion of a 
stock in the index in which stock membership is likely to be random. The MSCI ACWI cutoff 
point is the (free float-adjusted) market capitalization ranking of the first stock after which the 
index coverage is at least 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each country. 
Table 6 shows that the IV results are similar to those in Tables 3–5 when we use the 10% 
bandwidth. 
3.3. Quasi-natural experiment: stock additions to the MSCI index 
To further establish a causal effect of foreign institutional ownership (and validate the quality 
of our instrument), we perform a quasi-natural experiment using additions of stocks to the MSCI 
ACWI. In this approach, we employ a difference-in-differences estimation around the time a 
stock is added to the MSCI ACWI (treated firms). We identify 574 additions to the index and use 
the two years before and after each stock addition. We select control firms using propensity score 
matching with replacement that best matches each firm in the treatment group (the nearest 
                                                 
25 In untabulated results, we find that our results are qualitatively similar using the Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 
(1984) fixed effect Poisson model. 
26 For the Poisson regression with control function, we have also estimated bootstrapped cluster adjusted standard 
errors. The t-statistics associated with the coefficient on foreign institutional ownership are significant and range 
from 4.84 to 13.73 over the 300 bootstrap replications. 
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neighbor) on multiple lagged covariates (two years before the event): CAPEX+R&D, PATENTS, 
CLOSE, FXSALES, SALES, R&D_STOCK, CAPITAL/LABOR, IO_FOR, and country and 
industry fixed effects. Panel A of Table 7 reports results of the tests of equality of pre-treatment 
means and medians between the treatment and control groups. In general, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of equal means or medians between the treatment and control groups. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of difference-in-differences estimators using the 
treatment-control sample and firm and year fixed effects specifications. In these tests, the 
explanatory variable of interest is the interaction of the TREATED dummy variable (which 
equals one if a firm is added to the MSCI ACWI, and zero otherwise) with the AFTER dummy 
variable (which equals one in the year a firm is added to the MSCI ACWI and thereafter, and 
zero otherwise). The interaction term coefficient captures the differential effect between the 
treatment and control groups following a stock addition to the MSCI ACWI.  
Column 1 shows that foreign institutional ownership increases significantly by 2% of market 
capitalization after a (treated) firm is added to the MSCI ACWI relative to control firms. Column 
2 shows that the differential effect on domestic institutional ownership is near zero and 
statistically insignificant, which supports the exclusion restriction.27 We also find that firms in 
the treatment group increase long-term investment, employment, and innovation output 
(Columns 3–5) relative to control firms in the post-treatment period. These results are 
statistically and economically significant. The firms in the treatment group experience a 0.5% 
increase in long-term investment, a 14.3% increase in employment, and a 5.4% increase in 
innovation output following the addition of their stocks to the MSCI ACWI. These results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using the IV approach in Tables 3–5.28 
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the differences in foreign and domestic institutional ownership 
                                                 
27 This result suggests that foreign institutions are not buying their shares from domestic institutions. In unreported 
tests, we find that there is a statistically significant decrease in closely held shares, which suggests that insiders are 
the primary sellers of shares after MSCI ACWI additions. 
28 We also estimate difference-in-differences regressions including country-by-year and industry-by-year fixed 
effects. The estimates reported in Table IA.6 in the Internet Appendix are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7. 
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between the treatment and control groups in the two years before and after a firm’s stock is 
added to the MSCI ACWI (based on estimates in which TREATED is interacted with indicators 
for each event year). The index additions occur between event year −1 and year 0. Panel A 
shows that the two groups follow parallel trends in the pre-treatment period and that IO_FOR 
increases significantly after a firm is added to the MSCI ACWI. Panel B shows that there is no 
such pattern for IO_DOM, which alleviates concerns that the addition of a stock to the MSCI 
ACWI is driven by good news about the firm, since such news would likely drive all institutional 
investors to increase their stock holdings. Fig. 3 shows a positive differential effect on long-term 
investment, employment, and innovation output after a firm’s stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. 
We also perform a quasi-natural experiment using deletions of stocks from the MSCI ACWI. 
Table IA.7 in the Internet Appendix shows a negative differential effect on long-term 
investment, employment, and innovation output after a firm has been deleted from the MSCI 
ACWI. The coefficient on long-term investment is not statistically significant, which may be due 
to the small number of deletions (167 events). The results for stock deletions are opposite to 
those for stock additions, providing further support for the validity of our identification strategy. 
3.4. External financing 
A concern with our results might be that the addition of a firm’s stock to the index could 
increase the supply (or decrease the cost) of external capital, which could enable firms to raise 
more external finance and thus increase long-term investment. To address this concern, we use 
the difference-in-differences estimation to study the impact of stock additions to the MSCI 
ACWI on firms’ financial policies.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show that new equity issuance (EQ_ISSUES) and net equity 
issuance (NET_EQ_ISSUES) decrease by 1% and 0.7%, respectively, after a (treated) firm is 
added to the MSCI ACWI relative to control firms. Columns 3 and 4 show that treated firms 
increase new debt issuance (DEBT_ISSUES) and net debt issuance (NET_DEBT_ISSUES) by 
0.3% and 1% more than control firms following stock additions. Column 5 shows that treated 
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firms decrease new external debt and equity financing (EXT_FIN) by 0.7% more than control 
firms, while Column 6 shows that the differential effect on net external debt and equity financing 
(NET_EXT_FIN) is statistically insignificant. For internal financing, Column 7 shows that cash 
holdings (CASH) of treated firms decrease by 0.9% versus control firms following stock 
additions.  
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of the differences in new equity issuance, new debt issuance, 
external financing, and cash holdings between the treatment and control groups in the two years 
before and after a firm’s stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. Panel A shows that EQ_ISSUES 
decreases after a firm’s stock is added to the MSCI ACWI, while Panel B shows that 
DEBT_ISSUES increases after a firm’s stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. Panels C and D show 
that both EXT_FIN and CASH decrease following the inclusion of a firm’s stock in the MSCI 
ACWI.29 
The results in Table 8 and Fig. 4 suggest that firms experience an increase in financing needs 
due to an increase in long-term investments following the addition of their shares to the MSCI 
ACWI. This financing need is covered by a decrease in cash holdings (i.e., internal funds) and 
new debt issues, which is consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure. These 
results also show that treated firms do not issue more equity following additions of their shares to 
the MSCI ACWI, which indicates that an increase in the supply of capital (or a decrease in the 
cost of capital) does not explain our findings. The increase in debt issuance together with a 
decrease in cash holdings is consistent with the reduction of excess cash that managers can spend 
at their discretion (Jensen, 1986).30  
Overall, the results do not support the alternative hypothesis that the increases in long-term 
investment, employment, and innovation output are driven by increases in the supply of external 
                                                 
29 We also present the evolution of the differences in net equity issuance (NET_EQ_ISSUES) and net debt 
issuance (NET_DEBT_ISSUES) in Fig. IA.3 in the Internet Appendix. 




capital following the addition of a stock to the MSCI indexes. Rather, the results are consistent 
with foreign institutional investors being involved in monitoring firm management. 
3.5. Monitoring channel 
Our findings of a positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on long-term investment, 
employment, and innovation output are consistent with the idea that foreign institutions reduce 
managerial entrenchment by monitoring managers otherwise enjoying a “quiet” life (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2003) or insider blockholders that extract private benefits of control. 
Monitoring refers to influencing management directly (by voice) or indirectly by selling their 
shares (exit or voting with their feet). 
To examine whether the monitoring channel is operative in our sample, we first examine 
whether our effect is driven by foreign investors with longer versus shorter investment horizons. 
Short-term investors have fewer incentives to monitor and are more likely to motivate corporate 
managers to focus on short-term (earnings) goals rather than long-term investment. For example, 
the Kay Review (2012) in the United Kingdom argues that R&D expenditures by British 
businesses have been in steady decline and that the short-term incentives of asset managers have 
been pushed down to corporate managers. Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and 
Harford, Kecskes, and Mansi (2015), we measure investment horizons using investors’ portfolio 
turnover (churn rate). IO_FOR_LT is ownership by long-term foreign institutional investors, 
defined as those with portfolio turnover below the median. IO_FOR_ST is ownership by short-
term foreign institutional investors, defined as those with portfolio turnover above the median. 
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results. We estimate OLS regressions with CAPEX+R&D 
(Column 1), LABOR (Column 2), and PATENTS (Column 3) as dependent variables and find a 
positive relation with both long-term foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR_LT) and short-
term foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR_ST). Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, 
however, the relation is more pronounced for IO_FOR_LT. 
Second, we analyze whether our effect is driven by the nationality of foreign institutional 
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investors depending on the legal regime of the country of domicile. Previous research finds a 
positive relation between firm-level governance and ownership by institutional investors 
domiciled in countries with strong investor protection. Following Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and 
Matos (2011), we partition foreign institutional ownership according to the legal origin of the 
institution’s home country as defined in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998): common foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR_COMMON) or civil foreign 
institutional ownership (IO_FOR_CIVIL).  
Panel B of Table 9 reports the results. We find a positive and significant relation between all 
outcome variables and IO_FOR_COMMON. The IO_FOR_CIVIL coefficient, however, is 
statistically significant only in the case of LABOR. These results are consistent with foreign 
institutions from common law countries “exporting” good governance practices, providing 
further support for the monitoring hypothesis.  
Third, we examine whether the increases in long-term investment, employment, and 
innovation output due to the presence of foreign institutional ownership are larger when 
managers are entrenched. We measure managerial entrenchment using a firm-level index 
consisting of 41 governance attributes (GOV) defined by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2009) and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011). The GOV index provides a firm-level 
governance measure that is comparable across countries and incorporates information on board 
structure, anti-takeover provisions, auditors, compensation, and ownership structure. The index 
is constructed using data obtained from RiskMetrics/Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).31  
Table 10 reports the results. We estimate OLS regressions with CAPEX+R&D (Column 1), 
LABOR (Column 4), and PATENTS (Column 7) as dependent variables and foreign institutional 
ownership (IO_FOR), the governance index (GOV), and the interaction IO_FOR  GOV as main 
                                                 
31 GOV is similar in spirit to the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), but the scale is 
reversed—a higher GOV means more shareholder-friendly governance practices. 
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explanatory variables.32 We find a positive and significant relation between foreign institutional 
ownership and long-term investment, employment, and innovation output when we control for 
corporate governance. Further, we find that the effect is stronger when corporate governance is 
weaker, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction variable GOV 
 IO_FOR. These results suggest that the effect of foreign institutional ownership is more 
pronounced when managers are more entrenched and are thus consistent with the monitoring 
channel.  
Fourth, we examine the interaction of IO_FOR with the anti-self-dealing index (ANTI_SD) of 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), which measures the legal protection 
of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders at the country level. 
Columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table 10 show a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
variable ANTI_SD  IO_FOR, which suggests that the effect of foreign institutional investors is 
more pronounced in countries in which the problem of investor expropriation is more acute. 
These findings are again consistent with the monitoring hypothesis.33 
Our final test is based on the idea that, according to the monitoring channel, product market 
competition and institutional ownership are substitute governance mechanisms. Specifically, in 
highly competitive environments there is little managerial slack and therefore little need for 
institutional monitoring. An alternative view is that institutional involvement alleviates 
managers’ career concerns and risks and increases tolerance for failure (Manso, 2011). This 
career concern channel predicts that the positive effect of foreign institutions on innovation 
should be stronger when competition is higher. Following Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 
(2013), we measure COMPETITION as one minus the Lerner index for a given two-digit SIC 
                                                 
32 The sample of firms in these tests is smaller because of sparser coverage of the GOV measure, which is limited 
to the largest market capitalization firms in each country.  
33 We also analyze whether the impact of foreign institutional ownership varies with the legal origin and the level 
of economic development (proxied by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita) of the target country of foreign 
portfolio investments. Table IA.8 in the Internet Appendix shows that the effect of foreign institutional ownership is 




industry.34 In Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table 10, we find that the IO_FOR coefficient remains 
positive and significant when we control for COMPETITION. In Column 9, we find that the 
COMPETITION × IO_FOR coefficient is negative and significant, which indicates a more 
pronounced effect of foreign institutional ownership on innovation output in less competitive 
industries (the interaction variable coefficient is insignificant in the case of long-term investment 
and employment in Columns 3 and 6). We conclude that the results in Tables 9 and 10 support 
the view that the positive effect of foreign institutional ownership on long-term investment, 
employment, and innovation output is due to improved corporate governance through better 
monitoring. 
3.6. Human capital 
We show that foreign institutional ownership has a positive impact on employment, but this 
may be at a cost of lower salaries or an increase in the relative importance of low- versus high-
skill jobs. We thus explore how foreign institutional ownership affects measures of human 
capital: salaries as a fraction of sales (STAFF_COST) and average staff costs per employee 
(AV_STAFF_COST). These variables are available only for non-U.S. firms because there is no 
disclosure of total wage bills by U.S. firms. We also examine the effect of foreign institutional 
ownership on organization capital. Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolau (2013), we proxy for 
investment in organization capital using the ratio of selling, general, and administrative 
expenses-to-sales (SG&A). 
Table 11 shows the results for all proxies of investment in human capital using OLS 
(Columns 1, 3, and 5) and IV regressions (Columns 2, 4, and 6). We find a positive and 
significant effect of foreign institutional ownership on human and organization capital. The 
effects are also economically significant. Using the IV estimates in Columns 2 and 4, a 3% 
increase in foreign institutional ownership leads to a 3.9% increase in the ratio of staff costs-to-
                                                 
34 We obtain similar results when we use the Lerner index at the country-industry-year level. 
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sales and a 3.6% increase in the average staff costs. The magnitude of the effect is particularly 
strong in the case of organization capital: a 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads 
to an increase of about 5.7% in the ratio of SG&A-to-sales, as shown in Column 6. 
3.7. Productivity and performance 
So far, our evidence supports the view that foreign institutional investors foster long-term 
investments in tangible, intangible, and human capital, leading to higher innovation output. 
However, not all investment and innovative activities necessarily enhance firm value. To 
examine this issue, we conduct additional tests using several measures of firm performance. 
Table 12 presents the results using both OLS and IV regressions. 
We first ask whether foreign institutional ownership increases total factor productivity. We 
estimate a regression of the logarithm of total sales (SALES) on foreign institutional ownership 
(IO_FOR) controlling for the logarithm of capital (CAPITAL) and the logarithm of labor 
(LABOR). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 show that the IO_FOR coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant, which indicates that foreign institutional ownership leads to productivity 
gains. Using the IV estimate in Column 2, a 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads 
to a 5.8% increase in total sales.35 
The second measure is foreign operations. In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 12, we examine 
whether foreign institutional ownership leads to a growth in products and services that are 
marketed internationally. We use foreign sales as a fraction of total sales (FXSALES) as the 
dependent variable. We find that foreign institutional ownership leads to an increase in the 
internationalization of firms’ operations, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient 
on IO_FOR. Using the IV estimate in Column 4, a 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership 
leads to a 1.3% increase in the fraction of foreign sales. 
Our final measure is firm valuation. We estimate a regression in which Tobin’s Q 
                                                 




(TOBIN_Q) is the dependent variable. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 12 show that foreign 
institutional ownership leads to an increase in firm valuation. Using the IV estimate in Column 6, 
a 3% increase in foreign institutional ownership leads to an increase of about 0.12 in Tobin’s Q. 
Overall, the results of Table 12 suggest that increases in long-term investment in tangible, 
intangible, and human capital enhance firm value. 
3.8. Sample of non-U.S. firms and robustness checks  
We examine our results excluding U.S. firms because the United States represents a large 
fraction of our sample, institutional ownership is much higher in the United States than 
elsewhere in the world, and the quality of the data on institutional holdings, R&D, and patents is 
better in the United States than elsewhere. Table 13 reports the results when we restrict the 
sample to non-U.S. firms. Panels A and B show that the OLS and IV estimates are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in Tables 3–6. The only exception is that the coefficient on IO_FOR is 
positive but statistically insignificant in the IV specification for CAPEX+R&D (Column 2 of 
Panel A). Panel C shows that the difference-in-differences estimates are similar to those in Table 
7. We conclude that our findings based on the full sample are unchanged when we focus on the 
sample of non-U.S. firms. 
We also perform robustness checks of our long-term investment results. These results are 
presented in the Internet Appendix. In Table IA.9, we find similar results for foreign institutional 
ownership in the following cases: (1) the sample is restricted to the 2005–2010 post-IFRS 
adoption period, when R&D disclosure is harmonized worldwide; (2) the sample is restricted to 
firms with assets in excess of $10 million; (3) we control for country-by-year and industry-by-
year fixed effects to capture any country-specific and industry-specific time trends; (4) we scale 
CAPEX plus R&D expenditures by sales (instead of assets, as in our main tests); and (5) the 
sample is restricted to firms with positive R&D.  
Table IA.10 presents several robustness checks of our innovation output results. First, the 
sample is restricted to 2001–2008 to address truncation bias concerns because patents can be 
29 
 
granted multiple years after their applications are filed. Second, the sample is restricted to firms 
with assets in excess of $10 million. Third, we include country-by-year and industry-by-year 
fixed effects. Fourth, we consider alternative proxies for innovation output. Because patents may 
take several years to develop, we use patent counts computed over a three-year rolling window in 
Column 4. We also use patent counts scaled by technological class and time period in Column 5 
and the ratio of PATENTS-to-R&D_Stock (i.e., patent counts per a measure of input into the 
innovation process) in Column 6.36 Because the quality and value of patents may differ, we also 
consider patent counts weighted by the number of citations in Column 7 and “triadic” patents 
(i.e., patents filed with all three major patent officesUSPTO, EPO, and JPO) in Column 8. The 
findings in all these robustness tests confirm our baseline result that firms with higher foreign 
institutional ownership produce more innovation output. 
4. Conclusion 
We study the long-term effects of foreign institutional ownership on firm policies using firm-
level data from 30 countries over the 2001–2010 period. We identify the effects by exploiting the 
exogenous increase in foreign institutional ownership that follows the addition of a stock to the 
MSCI indexes. We find that higher foreign institutional ownership leads to more long-term 
investment in tangible, intangible, and human capital. Foreign institutional ownership also leads 
to a significant increase in innovation output, as well as to increases in internationalization of a 
firm’s operations and firm valuation. We show that these effects are explained by the 
disciplinary and monitoring roles of foreign institutions.  
Our results help to dismiss popular fears that portray foreign investors as predominantly 
interested in short-term gains, often at the expense of long-term investment, employment, and 
innovation. Although our sample does not encompass all types of foreign owners, we examine 
                                                 
36 Patent counts in different technology classes may not be directly comparable. In addition, large increases in the 
number of awarded patents in some technology classes over time might reflect the evolution of the USPTO practices 
with respect to what is a patentable invention, so patent counts from different time periods may not be time-
consistent measures of innovation productivity even within the same technology class. 
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the increasing role of foreign portfolio investors who hold minority stakes in firms around the 
world. We conclude that the globalization of firms’ shareholder structures due to increasing 
cross-border portfolio flows is a positive force for capital formation that facilitates the 
development of new technologies, products, and services and creates jobs. Our results do not 
support economic nationalism aimed at protecting local firms from foreign capital. Rather, our 
findings suggest that openness to international portfolio investment may generate positive 







CAPEX+R&D Capital expenditures (Worldscope item 04601) plus research and development expenditures (Worldscope item 01201) divided by assets 
(Worldscope item 02999). 
CAPEX Capital expenditures (Worldscope item 04601) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
R&D Research and development expenditures (Worldscope item 01201) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
LABOR Number of employees (Worldscope item 07011). 
PATENTS Number of patents applied for with the USPTO. 
TOBIN_Q Assets (Worldscope item 02999) plus market value of equity (Worldscope item 08001) minus book value of equity (Worldscope item 
03501) divided by total assets. 
SALES Sales in thousands of dollars (Worldscope item 01001). 
FXSALES Foreign sales (Worldscope item 07101) divided by sales (Worldscope item 01001). 
STAFF_COST Staff costs (Worldscope item 01084) divided by sales (Worldscope item 01001). 
AV_STAFF_COST Staff costs in thousands of dollars (Worldscope item 01084) divided by the number of employees (Worldscope item 07011). 
SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expenses (Worldscope item 01101) divided by sales (Worldscope item 01001). 
IO_TOTAL Holdings (end-of-year) by all institutions as a fraction of market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR Holdings (end-of-year) by institutions located in a different country from the country where the stock is listed as a fraction of market 
capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_DOM Holdings (end-of-year) by institutions located in the same country where the stock is listed as a fraction of market capitalization 
(FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_LT Holdings (end-of-year) by long-term foreign institutions, defined as those with portfolio turnover below the median, as a fraction of 
market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_ST Holdings (end-of-year) by long-term foreign institutions, defined as those with portfolio turnover above the median, as a fraction of 
market capitalization (FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_COMMON Holdings (end-of-year) by foreign institutions domiciled in common law countries as a fraction of market capitalization 
(FactSet/LionShares). 
IO_FOR_CIVIL Holdings (end-of-year) by foreign institutions domiciled in civil law countries as a fraction of market capitalization 
(FactSet/LionShares). 
CLOSE Number of shares held by insiders (shareholders who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, such as officers, directors, immediate 
families, and other corporations or individuals), as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding (Worldscope item 08021). 




Table A.1 (continued) 
Variable Definition 
R&D_STOCK St  = Rt  + (1 − δ) St−1 where St is R&D_STOCK in year t, Rt is R&D expenditures in dollars in year t, and δ = 0.15 is the private 
depreciation rate of knowledge. 
FCF Net income before extraordinary items (Worldscope item 01551) plus depreciation (Worldscope item 04049) minus capital 
expenditures (Worldscope item 04601) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
LEVERAGE Total debt (Worldscope item 03255) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
TANGIBILITY Net property, plant, and equipment (Worldscope item 02501) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
CASH Cash holdings (Worldscope item 02001) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
GOV 
 
Corporate governance index, defined as the percentage of 41 governance attributes for which the firm meets the minimally acceptable 
guidelines (RiskMetrics/ISS). 
ANTI_SD Anti-self-dealing index, which measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against self-dealing by the controlling 
shareholder (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). 
COMPETITION One minus the Lerner index, defined as the industry (two-digit SIC) median gross profit margin (Worldscope item 08306). 
EQ_ISSUES Proceeds of new secondary equity offerings (SDC) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
NET_EQ_ISSUES Net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred equity (Worldscope item 04251) minus common and preferred redeemed, 
retired, or converted equity (Worldscope item 04751) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
DEBT_ISSUES Proceeds of new debt issues (SDC) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
NET_DEBT_ISSUES Long-term borrowings (Worldscope item 04401) minus reduction in long-term debt (Worldscope item 04701) plus the 
increase/decrease in short-term borrowings (Worldscope item 04821) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
EXT_FIN EQ_ISSUES + DEBT_ISSUES 
NET_EXT_FIN NET_EQ_ISSUES + NET_DEBT_ISSUES 
CASH Change in cash and/or liquid items (Worldscope item 04452) divided by assets (Worldscope item 02999). 
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Institutional ownership, long-term investment, and innovation 
This table shows the number of publicly listed firms and statistics on capital expenditures (CAPEX), research and development (R&D) expenditures, number 
of patents applied for with the USPTO, and foreign and domestic institutional ownership (as a fraction of market capitalization) by country (Panel A) and 
industry (Panel B). Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 
2001–2010 period.  
Panel A: Statistics by country 
























North America United States 8,657 4,702.1 0.050  1,873.5 0.051 298,200 6.17  0.08 0.67 
Canada 1,311 610.2 0.085  40.5 0.034 5,957 1.15  0.26 0.27 
Europe Germany 919 1,045.8 0.050  410.5 0.022 29,484 4.90  0.23 0.06 
France 977 900.6 0.046  235.2 0.015 8,767 1.41  0.19 0.08 
Netherlands 192 224.6 0.051  100.7 0.014 7,893 5.97  0.34 0.03 
Switzerland 224 193.3 0.044  194.8 0.028 5,759 3.55  0.25 0.04 
Finland 145 77.0 0.055  63.5 0.034 5,347 4.66  0.26 0.09 
Sweden 499 131.9 0.037  76.7 0.024 4,407 1.50  0.14 0.26 
United Kingdom 2,199 1,107.8 0.047  201.3 0.026 2,476 0.20  0.20 0.13 
Denmark 160 98.6 0.058  22.4 0.026 1,343 1.24  0.21 0.07 
Belgium 135 84.3 0.058  19.4 0.019 875 0.99  0.18 0.01 
Italy 269 341.7 0.042  53.1 0.006 751 0.41  0.18 0.02 
Norway 259 179.3 0.074  7.9 0.013 304 0.22  0.13 0.10 
Austria 107 62.2 0.067  4.9 0.021 231 0.36  0.20 0.02 
Ireland 84 34.6 0.049  5.1 0.017 12 0.03  0.39 0.01 
Spain 148 309.3 0.049  3.4 0.003 42 0.04  0.18 0.02 
  Hungary 40 18.6 0.082  1.0 0.007 53 0.23  0.23 0.01 
Asia Pacific Japan 4,152 2,673.3 0.036  1,143.5 0.013 212,034 6.56  0.09 0.04 
South Korea 1,691 676.1 0.053  77.9 0.009 56,020 5.81  0.14 0.00 
Taiwan 1,573 337.1 0.050  74.7 0.025 41,147 4.29  0.15 0.02 
India 1,121 250.9 0.081  9.5 0.003 1,869 0.45  0.08 0.03 
Singapore 534 67.4 0.048  2.9 0.002 1,289 0.58  0.13 0.02 
China 1,904 950.6 0.062  32.2 0.002 752 0.07  0.09 0.06 
Australia 1,049 284.5 0.067  7.4 0.016 372 0.08  0.17 0.02 
Hong Kong 857 365.0 0.043  8.7 0.005 32 0.01  0.11 0.03 
New Zealand 49 10.7 0.070  0.2 0.006 77 0.39  0.12 0.03 
  Malaysia 898 53.2 0.044  1.3 0.001 14 0.00  0.06 0.01 
Other  Israel 298 25.1 0.035  12.3 0.050 825 0.62  0.47 0.01 
Brazil 205 343.9 0.065  9.0 0.001 192 0.21  0.24 0.03 
  South Africa 296 117.8 0.067  2.1 0.003 17 0.01  0.20 0.04 
Total Non-U.S. 22,295 11,575.4 0.050  2,822.0 0.015 388,341 2.92  0.16 0.07 
  All countries 30,952 16,277.5 0.050  4,695.5 0.024 686,541 3.79  0.13 0.30 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Statistics by industry 


















Non-U.S. 1: Consumer Non-Durables 2,244   529.4 0.046  97.2 0.005   5,065 0.36 
firms 2: Consumer Durables 1,013 1,645.2 0.056  733.9 0.016 112,615 17.15 
3: Manufacturing 3,838 1,485.5 0.049  471.8 0.010 61,245 2.55 
4: Energy 831 1,860.1 0.129  46.0 0.002 762 0.22 
5: Chemicals and Allied Products 952 399.2 0.055  158.8 0.013 21,010 3.37 
6: Business Equipment 4,315 775.7 0.043  606.4 0.036 165,387 6.60 
7: Telecom 509 1,506.6 0.066  87.9 0.007 3,781 1.35 
9: Shops 2,622 1,031.8 0.042  40.6 0.002 2,614 0.16 
10: Healthcare 1,105 269.1 0.047  511.4 0.047 13,980 2.20 
  12: Other 4,866   2,072.9 0.050  67.8 0.007   1,882 0.07 
U.S. 1: Consumer Non-Durables 474   204.5 0.040  28.5 0.009   2,664 0.99 
firms 2: Consumer Durables 209 134.1 0.044  126.7 0.034 11,272 8.98 
3: Manufacturing 832 323.9 0.042  186.7 0.025 32,846 6.34 
4: Energy 472 1,153.1 0.155  25.2 0.004 580 0.23 
5: Chemicals and Allied Products 215 141.3 0.041  85.8 0.035 4,795 3.73 
6: Business Equipment 2,306 451.8 0.035  840.3 0.099 214,557 16.85 
7: Telecom 395 650.0 0.067  9.2 0.019 2,521 1.32 
9: Shops 954 592.9 0.057  16.6 0.005 1,073 0.20 
10: Healthcare 1,128 267.0 0.036  524.0 0.109 24,330 3.64 
  12: Other 1,672   783.5 0.052  30.6 0.019   3,562 0.41 
All 1: Consumer Non-Durables 2,718   733.9 0.046  125.6 0.006   7,729 0.47 
firms 2: Consumer Durables 1,222 1,779.3 0.054  860.7 0.019 123,887 15.84 
3: Manufacturing 4,670 1,809.5 0.048  658.5 0.012 94,091 3.23 
4: Energy 1,303 3,013.1 0.140  71.1 0.002 1,342 0.22 
5: Chemicals and Allied Products 1,167 540.5 0.053  244.6 0.016 25,805 3.43 
6: Business Equipment 6,621 1,227.4 0.040  1,446.7 0.058 379,944 10.05 
7: Telecom 904 2,156.6 0.067  97.2 0.012 6,302 1.34 
9: Shops 3,576 1,624.7 0.046  57.2 0.003 3,687 0.17 
10: Healthcare 2,233 536.1 0.041  1,035.4 0.079 38,310 2.94 
  12: Other 6,538   2,856.4 0.050  98.4 0.010   5,444 0.15 
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Table 2  
Summary statistics 
This table shows mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for each 
variable. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The sample consists of Worldscope 




deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
CAPEX+R&D 0.071 0.043 0.085 0.000 0.798 181,173 
CAPEX 0.047 0.027 0.062 0.000 0.458 181,173 
R&D 0.024 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.340 181,173 
LABOR 4,133 650 10,888 1 70,700 166,305 
PATENTS 1.280 0.000 5.809 0.000 43.000 181,173 
SALES ($ million) 941 120 2,740 0 18,341 181,173 
FXSALES 0.157 0.000 0.272 0.000 0.954 181,173 
TOBIN_Q 2.120 1.243 4.451 0.413 60.589 171,432 
STAFF_COST 0.342 0.185 0.858 0.001 9.238 73,259 
AV_STAFF_COST ($ thousands) 45 36 43 0 328 70,274 
SG&A 0.440 0.201 0.850 0.026 4.956 144,800 
IO_TOTAL 0.153 0.021 0.259 0.000 1.000 181,173 
IO_FOR 0.027 0.001 0.067 0.000 1.000 181,173 
IO_DOM 0.126 0.004 0.246 0.000 1.000 181,173 
IO_FOR_LT 0.023 0.000 0.060 0.000 1.000 181,173 
IO_FOR_ST 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.000 1.000 181,173 
IO_FOR_COMMON 0.019 0.000 0.056 0.000 1.000 181,173 
IO_FOR_CIVIL 0.007 0.000 0.021 0.000 1.000 181,173 
CLOSE 0.287 0.242 0.275 0.000 0.913 181,173 
CAPITAL/LABOR  192 41 790 0 9,959 181,173 
R&D_STOCK ($ million) 30 0 92 0 490 181,173 
FCF -0.132 0.015 0.729 -7.818 0.344 179,360 
LEVERAGE 0.257 0.194 0.346 0.000 3.219 181,046 
CASH 0.180 0.116 0.189 0.000 0.989 180,998 
TANGIBILITY 0.284 0.240 0.222 0.000 0.948 181,166 
GOV 0.537 0.537 0.128 0.220 0.927 37,061 
ANTI_SD 0.617 0.654 0.187 0.181 1.000 181,173 
COMPETITION 0.760 0.765 0.072 0.404 1.000 181,173 
EQ_ISSUES 0.012 0.000 0.091 0.000 2.003 181,173 
NET_EQ_ISSUES 0.026 0.000 0.124 -0.090 1.090 181,173 
DEBT_ISSUES 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.178 181,173 
NET_DEBT_ISSUES 0.006 0.000 0.087 -0.263 0.549 181,173 
EXT_FIN 0.014 0.000 0.095 0.000 2.058 181,173 
NET_EXT_FIN 0.035 0.000 0.179 -0.236 1.462 181,173 
CASH 0.001 0.000 0.105 -0.546 0.519 181,173 





Foreign institutional ownership and long-term investment 
This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) firm-level panel 
regressions of long-term investment on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope nonfinancial and 
nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. In Panel A the dependent variable is the sum of capital expenditures and 
R&D expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX+R&D). In Panel B the dependent variable is CAPEX or R&D. 
Regressions in Panel B include the same control variables as those in Panel A (coefficients not shown). In the IV 
regression, foreign institutional ownership is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is 
a member of the MSCI ACWI in a given year, and zero otherwise). All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-
year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Long-term investment 
 First stage OLS IV 
Dependent variable IO_FOR CAPEX+R&D CAPEX+R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IO_FOR  0.022*** 0.094** 
  (0.005) (0.038) 
IO_DOM 0.003* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
CLOSE -0.010*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FXSALES 0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
log(SALES) 0.004*** -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
log(CAPITAL/LABOR) 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
TOBIN_Q 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FCF -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE -0.004*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
CASH 0.008*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
TANGIBILITY -0.010*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
MSCI 0.029***   
 (0.002)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.81 0.64  
Number of observations 175,912 175,912 175,912 
43 
 
Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Long-term investment-individual components 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Dependent variable CAPEX CAPEX R&D R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IO_FOR 0.017*** 0.073** 0.005* 0.031** 
 (0.003) (0.034) (0.003) (0.015) 
IO_DOM 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.56  0.80  





Foreign institutional ownership and employment 
This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) firm-level panel 
regressions of employment on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility 
firms in the 2001–2010 period. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees (LABOR). In 
the IV regression, foreign institutional ownership is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI in a given year, and zero otherwise). All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 First stage OLS IV 
Dependent variable IO_FOR LABOR LABOR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IO_FOR  0.651*** 3.876*** 
  (0.061) (0.458) 
IO_DOM -0.000 0.392*** 0.393*** 
 (0.002) (0.029) (0.025) 
CLOSE -0.010*** 0.001 0.037*** 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.014) 
FXSALES 0.005*** 0.100*** 0.083*** 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.021) 
log(SALES) 0.005*** 0.329*** 0.313*** 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.007) 
TOBIN_Q 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
FCF -0.001*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.007) 
LEVERAGE -0.004*** -0.088*** -0.075*** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.015) 
CASH 0.008*** -0.075*** -0.103*** 
 (0.002) (0.027) (0.025) 
TANGIBILITY -0.002 0.230*** 0.238*** 
 (0.002) (0.031) (0.037) 
MSCI 0.028***   
 (0.002)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.81 0.97  





Foreign institutional ownership and innovation output 
This table shows results of firm-level panel regressions of innovation output on institutional ownership using a 
sample of Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. Panel A shows results of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
one plus the number of patents applied for with the USPTO (PATENTS). In the IV regression, foreign institutional 
ownership is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI 
in a given year, and zero otherwise). Panel B shows results of Poisson regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the number of patents applied for with the USPTO. In Panel B, regressions include firm fixed effects using the pre-
sample mean scaling method of Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999), and the IV estimation is implemented 
using the control function approach of Blundell and Powell (2004). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
The sample in Panel A consists of firms with at least one patent applied for during the sample period. The sample in 
Panel B consists of all firms. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Linear model 
 First stage OLS IV 
Dependent variable IO_FOR PATENTS PATENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IO_FOR  0.243** 3.655*** 
  (0.099) (1.006) 
IO_DOM -0.005* 0.107*** 0.127*** 
 (0.003) (0.033) (0.043) 
CLOSE -0.012*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.028) 
FXSALES 0.003 -0.057** -0.068** 
 (0.003) (0.028) (0.032) 
log(SALES) 0.005*** 0.051*** 0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
log(CAPITAL/LABOR) 0.002*** -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
log(R&D_STOCK) -0.000 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
MSCI 0.027***   
 (0.002)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.82 0.82  




Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Count-data model 
 First stage Poisson 
Poisson 
(control function) 
Dependent variable IO_FOR PATENTS PATENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IO_FOR  1.494*** 5.446*** 
  (0.179) (0.455) 
IO_DOM -0.010*** 0.827*** 0.933*** 
 (0.002) (0.049) (0.049) 
CLOSE -0.006** 0.485*** 0.574*** 
 (0.003) (0.044) (0.050) 
FXSALES 0.031*** 0.272*** 0.158*** 
 (0.003) (0.052) (0.042) 
log(SALES) 0.005*** 0.113*** 0.059*** 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) 
log(CAPITAL/LABOR) 0.001*** 0.045** 0.034* 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.019) 
log(R&D_STOCK) 0.001*** 0.162*** 0.153*** 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.013) 
MSCI 0.066***   
 (0.003)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects (pre-sample) Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.29 0.68 0.68 






Instrumental variables estimates with bandwidth 
This table shows results of instrumental variables (IV) firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment, 
employment, and innovation output on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope nonfinancial and 
nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. The sample is restricted to firms in the 10% bandwidth of the number of 
stocks around the MSCI ACWI cutoff point in each country. The cutoff point is the (free float-adjusted) market 
capitalization ranking of the first stock after which the index coverage is at least 85% of the free float-adjusted 
market capitalization in each country. The dependent variables are the sum of capital expenditures and R&D 
expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX+R&D), the logarithm of the number of employees (LABOR), and the 
logarithm of one plus the number of patents applied for with the USPTO (PATENTS). Foreign institutional 
ownership is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI 
in a given year, and zero otherwise). Regressions include the same control variables as those in Tables 3–5 
(coefficients not shown). Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. All explanatory variables 
are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 First stage  IV 
Dependent variable IO_FOR  CAPEX+R&D LABOR PATENTS 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
IO_FOR   0.099*** 7.485*** 8.953*** 
   (0.032) (0.572) (0.940) 
IO_DOM 0.001  0.001 0.322*** 0.124*** 
 (0.003)  (0.006) (0.051) (0.040) 
MSCI 0.035***     
 (0.002)     
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.41     






Difference-in-differences around stock additions to MSCI ACWI 
This table shows results of difference-in-differences regressions of institutional ownership, long-term investment, 
employment, and innovation output around the time a stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. The sample includes 
Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. Panel A shows pre-treatment (two years 
before the treatment) means and medians of non-treated, treated, and control groups and tests of the difference in 
mean and median between treated and control groups. Treated firms consist of 574 firms added to the MSCI ACWI 
during the sample period. Non-treated firms are all other firms. Control firms are firms that best match treated firms 
using propensity scores (nearest neighbor). The dependent variables are foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR), 
domestic institutional ownership (IO_DOM), the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenditures as a fraction of 
assets (CAPEX+R&D), the logarithm of the number of employees (LABOR), and the logarithm of one plus number 
of patents applied for with the USPTO (PATENTS). TREATED is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is 
added to the MSCI ACWI, and zero otherwise. AFTER is a dummy variable that equals one in the year a firm is 
added to the MSCI ACWI and thereafter, and zero otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics (pre-treatment) 
 Mean  Median 
 
Non-




treated Treated Control 
Pearson χ2 
(p-value) 
CAPEX+R&D 0.092 0.080 0.075 0.07  0.048 0.063 0.062 0.62 
log(1+PATENTS) 0.235 0.823 0.854 0.58  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.76 
CLOSE 0.287 0.302 0.316 0.19  0.242 0.266 0.278 0.38 
FXSALES 0.153 0.265 0.265 0.99  0.000 0.149 0.167 0.48 
log(SALES) 11.516 14.418 14.472 0.40  11.626 14.413 14.564 0.03 
log(R&D_STOCK) 4.085 6.109 6.089 0.93  0.000 8.486 7.789 0.34 
log(CAPITAL/LABOR) 3.708 4.444 4.396 0.46  3.693 4.294 4.240 0.59 
IO_FOR 0.025 0.072 0.072 0.89  0.001 0.039 0.033 0.01 
 
Panel B: Difference-in-differences estimates 
Dependent variable IO_FOR IO_DOM CAPEX+R&D LABOR PATENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TREATED × AFTER 0.020*** -0.005 0.005*** 0.143*** 0.054** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.019) (0.022) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.87 0.97 0.79 0.97 0.95 





External financing around stock additions to MSCI ACWI 
This table shows results of difference-in-differences regressions of financial policy variables around the time a stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. The sample 
includes Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. Treated firms consist of 574 firms added to the MSCI ACWI during the sample 
period. Control firms are firms that best match treated firms using propensity scores (nearest neighbor). The dependent variables are new equity issuance 
(EQ_ISSUES), net equity issuance (NET_EQ_ISSUES), new debt issuance (DEBT_ISSUES), net debt issuance (NET_DEBT_ISSUES), new external financing 
(EXT_FIN), net external financing (NET_EXT_FIN), and change in cash holdings (CASH); all variables are scaled by assets. TREATED is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm is added to the MSCI ACWI, and zero otherwise. AFTER is a dummy variable that equals one in the year a firm is added to the MSCI 
ACWI and thereafter, and zero otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level 
clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable EQ_ ISSUES NET_EQ_ ISSUES DEBT_ ISSUES NET_DEBT_ ISSUES EXT_ FIN NET_ EXT_ FIN CASH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TREATED × AFTER -0.010*** -0.007*** 0.003*** 0.010*** -0.007* 0.003 -0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.26 0.43 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.38 0.19 




Type of foreign institutional ownership: investor horizon and legal origin 
This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment, 
employment, and innovation output on different types of foreign institutional ownership using a sample of 
Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. The dependent variables are the sum of 
capital expenditures and R&D expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX+R&D), the logarithm of the number of 
employees (LABOR), and the logarithm of one plus the number of patents applied for with the USPTO (PATENTS). 
IO_FOR_LT is ownership by long-term foreign institutional investors, defined as those with portfolio turnover 
below the median. IO_FOR_ST is ownership by short-term foreign institutional investors, defined as those with 
portfolio turnover above the median. IO_FOR_COMMON is ownership by foreign institutional investors domiciled 
in common law countries. IO_FOR_CIVIL is ownership by foreign institutional investors domiciled in civil law 
countries. Regressions include the same control variables as those in Tables 3–5 (coefficients not shown). All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. The sample in Column 3 consists of firms with at least one patent 
applied for during the sample period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable CAPEX+R&D LABOR PATENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Investor horizon 
IO_FOR_LT 0.025*** 0.692*** 0.246** 
 (0.006) (0.063) (0.104) 
IO_FOR_ST 0.004 0.402*** 0.229* 
 (0.013) (0.105) (0.137) 
IO_DOM 0.001 0.392*** 0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.029) (0.032) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.64 0.97 0.82 
Number of observations 175,912 161,443 48,096 
Panel B: Investor legal origin 
IO_FOR_COMMON 0.024*** 0.632*** 0.235** 
 (0.007) (0.071) (0.111) 
IO_FOR_CIVIL 0.015 0.710*** 0.276 
 (0.012) (0.132) (0.220) 
IO_DOM 0.001 0.391*** 0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.029) (0.032) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.64 0.97 0.82 






This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) firm-level panel regressions of long-term investment, employment, and innovation output on 
institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. The dependent variables are the sum of capital 
expenditures and R&D expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX+R&D), the logarithm of the number of employees (LABOR), and the logarithm of one plus 
the number of patents applied for with the USPTO (PATENTS). Corporate governance is measured using the firm-level governance index (GOV) centered at the 
mean. Investor protection is measured using the anti-self-dealing index (ANTI_SD). Product market competition is measured using one minus the median 
industry Lerner index (COMPETITION) centered at the mean. Regressions include the same control variables as in Tables 3–5 (coefficients not shown). All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year 
level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable CAPEX+R&D  LABOR  PATENTS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
IO_FOR 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.041***  0.658*** 1.101*** 1.105***  1.237*** 0.556*** 0.621*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.163) (0.109) (0.101)  (0.193) (0.078) (0.083) 
IO_DOM 0.006*** -0.003 -0.003  0.395*** 0.735*** 0.703***  0.230*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.027) (0.034) (0.036)  (0.027) (0.045) (0.046) 
GOV 0.019***    0.515***    0.271***   
 (0.006)    (0.040)    (0.050)   
GOV × IO_FOR -0.249***    -3.309***    -2.880**   
 (0.036)    (1.088)    (1.303)   
ANTI_SD × IO_FOR  -0.050***    -0.883***    -1.568***  
  (0.013)    (0.329)    (0.339)  
COMPETITION × IO_FOR   0.032    0.845    -1.271*** 
   (0.042)    (0.521)    (0.419) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.31 0.21 0.21  0.86 0.80 0.80  0.38 0.28 0.27 




Human and organization capital 
This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) firm-level panel 
regressions of measures of human and organization capital on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope 
nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. The dependent variable is the ratio of staff costs to sales 
(STAFF_COST), the logarithm of staff costs per employee (AV_STAFF_COST), and the ratio of selling, general, and 
administrative expenses to sales (SG&A). In the IV regressions, foreign institutional ownership is instrumented with 
MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI in a given year, and zero 
otherwise). Regressions include the same control variables as those in Table 4 (coefficients not shown). All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable STAFF_COST  AV_STAFF_COST  SG&A 
 OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
IO_FOR 0.128** 1.297***  0.185*** 1.187***  0.282*** 1.896*** 
 (0.060) (0.224)  (0.053) (0.436)  (0.052) (0.208) 
IO_DOM 0.047 0.044  0.030 0.029  0.070*** 0.072*** 
 (0.047) (0.064)  (0.055) (0.040)  (0.017) (0.020) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.70   0.91   0.82  





Productivity, foreign sales, and firm valuation 
This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) firm-level panel 
regressions of measures of productivity and firm valuation on institutional ownership using a sample of Worldscope 
nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. The dependent variables are the logarithm of sales 
(SALES), foreign sales as a fraction of total sales (FXSALES), and Tobin’s Q (TOBIN_Q). In the IV regressions, 
foreign institutional ownership is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a member 
of the MSCI ACWI in a given year, and zero otherwise). The regression of SALES includes CLOSE, R&D_STOCK, 
CAPITAL (log), and LABOR (log) as controls (coefficients not shown). The regressions of FXSALES and TOBIN_Q 
include the same control variables as those in Table 3 (coefficients not shown). All explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for 
country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable SALES  FXSALES  TOBIN_Q 
 OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
IO_FOR 0.438*** 1.919***  0.076*** 0.430***  1.660*** 3.949* 
 (0.058) (0.380)  (0.019) (0.132)  (0.434) (2.054) 
IO_DOM 0.341*** 0.339***  0.022*** 0.021***  0.250* 0.258*** 
 (0.043) (0.025)  (0.008) (0.006)  (0.138) (0.090) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.97   0.82   0.66  





Sample of non-U.S. firms 
This table shows results of firm-level regressions of long-term investment, employment, and innovation output on institutional ownership using a sample of 
Worldscope non-U.S., nonfinancial, and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. The dependent variable is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D 
expenditures as a fraction of assets (CAPEX+R&D), the logarithm of the number of employees (LABOR), and the logarithm of one plus the number of patents 
applied for with the USPTO (PATENTS). Panel A shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) panel regressions, as well as 
Poisson regressions in which the dependent variable is the number of patents applied for with the USPTO. In the IV regressions, foreign institutional ownership 
is instrumented with MSCI (a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI in a given year, and zero otherwise). Poisson regressions 
include firm fixed effects using the pre-sample mean scaling method of Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999), and the IV estimation is implemented using 
the control function approach of Blundell and Powell (2004). Panel B shows results of instrumental variables (IV) firm-level panel regressions using a sample 
restricted to firms in the 10% bandwidth of the number of stocks around the MSCI cutoff point in each country. The cutoff point is the (free float-adjusted) 
market capitalization ranking of the first stock after which the index coverage is at least 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each country. 
Regressions include the same control variables as those in Tables 3–5 (coefficients not shown). Panel C shows results of difference-in-differences regressions 
around the time a stock is added to the MSCI ACWI. Treated firms consist of 379 firms added to the MSCI ACWI during the sample period. Control firms are 
firms that best match treated firms using propensity scores (nearest neighbor). TREATED is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is added to the MSCI 
ACWI, and zero otherwise. AFTER is a dummy variable that equals one in the year a firm is added to the MSCI ACWI and thereafter, and zero otherwise. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. The sample in Columns 5 and 6 consists of firms with at least one patent applied for during the sample period. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors adjusted for country-year level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Panel regressions 
Dependent variable CAPEX+R&D  LABOR  PATENTS 
       Linear model  Count model 
 OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  Poisson 
Poisson 
(control function) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
IO_FOR 0.012** 0.040  0.581*** 3.351***  0.145 3.673***  0.753*** 4.524*** 
 (0.005) (0.041)  (0.062) (0.512)  (0.110) (1.274)  (0.143) (0.491) 
IO_DOM 0.007 0.006  0.512*** 0.469***  -0.108 -0.131  1.251*** 0.776* 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.062) (0.056)  (0.109) (0.144)  (0.447) (0.413) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  No No 
Firm fixed effects (pre-sample) No No  No No  No No  Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No No  No No  No No  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No  No No  No No  Yes Yes 
R2 0.61   0.96   0.82   0.70 0.70 




Table 13 (continued) 
Panel B: Instrumental variables estimates with bandwidth 
 First stage  IV 
Dependent variable IO_FOR  CAPEX+R&D LABOR PATENTS 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
IO_FOR   0.086*** 6.579*** 6.676*** 
   (0.032) (0.585) (0.921) 
IO_DOM 0.066***  0.007 0.507*** -0.641*** 
 (0.022)  (0.012) (0.179) (0.216) 
MSCI 0.041***     
 (0.003)     
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.42     
Number of observations 26,158  26,158 24,224 26,401 
 
Panel C: Difference-in-differences estimates 
Dependent variable IO_FOR IO_DOM CAPEX+R&D LABOR PATENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TREATED × AFTER 0.029*** -0.003 0.003 0.145*** 0.077*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.026) (0.027) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.86 0.97 0.75 0.97 0.94 




Fig. 1. Foreign institutional ownership around the MSCI ACWI cutoff point. This figure plots foreign institutional 
ownership (IO_FOR) against the cumulative share of firms. The MSCI ACWI cutoff point is the (free float-
adjusted) market capitalization ranking of the first stock after which the index coverage is at least 85% of the free 
float-adjusted market capitalization in each country. The dots correspond to the sample means of the two variables 
in each bin, in which the number of bins is selected to mimic the variability of the data using the Calonico, Cattaneo, 
and Titiunik (2015) estimator. The solid line is a second-order polynomial estimated separately for firms above and 
below the cutoff ranking. The sample includes Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in 2009 (the final year 






Panel A: Foreign institutional ownership 
 
Panel B: Domestic institutional ownership 
 
Fig. 2. Institutional ownership around stock additions to MSCI ACWI. This figure shows point estimates and 90% 
confidence interval of the differences in foreign institutional ownership (IO_FOR) and domestic institutional 
ownership (IO_DOM) between treated firms and control firms around stock additions to the MSCI ACWI (between 
year −1 and year 0). Treated firms consist of 574 firms added to the MSCI ACWI during the sample period. Control 
firms are firms that best match treated firms using propensity scores (nearest neighbor). The sample includes 
Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table 





Panel A: Long-term investment (CAPEX+R&D) 
 





Panel C: Patent count (PATENTS) 
 
Fig. 3. Long-term investment, employment, and innovation around stock additions to the MSCI ACWI. This figure 
shows point estimates and 90% confidence interval of the differences in long-term investment (R&D+CAPEX), 
employment (LABOR), and patent counts (PATENTS) between treated firms and control firms around stock 
additions to the MSCI ACWI (between year −1 and year 0). Treated firms consist of 574 firms added to the MSCI 
ACWI during the sample period. Control firms are firms that best match treated firms using propensity scores 
(nearest neighbor). The sample includes Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 2001–2010 period. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
60 
 
Panel A: New equity issuance (EQ_ISSUES)  
 





Panel C: New external debt and equity financing (EXT_FIN) 
 
Panel D: Change in cash holdings (CASH) 
 
Fig. 4. External financing around stock additions to the MSCI ACWI. This figure shows point estimates and 90% 
confidence interval of the differences in new equity issuance (EQ_ISSUES), new debt issuance (DEBT_ISSUES), 
new external debt and equity financing (EXT_FIN), and change in cash holdings (CASH) between treated firms and 
control firms around stock additions to the MSCI ACWI (between year −1 and year 0). Treated firms consist of 574 
firms added to the MSCI ACWI during the sample period. Control firms are firms that best match treated firms 
using propensity scores (nearest neighbor). The sample includes Worldscope nonfinancial and nonutility firms in the 
2001–2010 period. Variable definitions are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
 
 
